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HE space program is, by nature, an activity that encompasses a num- 
ber of discrete projects, each aimed toward achieving specific objec- 
tives within a finite period. Like many other advanced-technology enter- 
prises, NASA has relied heavily on the techniques of organizing manpower 
and physicall resources into project structures to achieve goals involving 
specified cost, schedule, and performance requirements. 
In  one sense, there is little new or unique about project management. 
Much that has been achieved in human progress has come by dedicating 
and organizing human energies and physical resources to meet specific 
goals. Modern industrialized society has become dependent on this type 
of management to a higher degree than ever before. Not only in the 
areas of hard sciences but also in the fields of social, economic, and 
political affairs, there is an increasing tendency to tackle problems through 
a project approach. 
Despite the long history of project management, we still know relatively 
little about what might be called its human aspects-what kinds of people 
fit into a project organization, what effect project assignments have on 
professional development, how institutions and their employees are affected 
by the discontinuities that are a necessary concomitant of project manage- 
ment. We still have much to learn about how to make the most of the 
potential offered by project management while minimizing the side effects. 
The following analysis seeks to draw some lessons from the experience 
gained in two NASA projects. There are inherent drawbacks to such an 
approach in that the events themselves are relatively recent; the perspec- 
tive is therefore quite close, and dispassionate judgments are difficult to 
reach without the softening of time. There are, on the other hand, values 
to such an examination while memories are still fresh and source materials 
readily available. Inevitably, there are disagreements with the final results ; 
in the evolution of programs and institutions, this can be healthy. The 
cause of learning is not best served by reporting only on successes; im- 
portant contributions come from experience with difficulties and problems. 
Although there are obvious limits on the extent to which valid generaliza- 
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tions can be drawn from only two sets of experiences, this study represents 
a useful addition to a limited literature. 
For readers familiar with aerospace programs, the study may provide 
a new look at familiar ground. For those from other fields, it may offer 
a bridge by which management experience from two aerospace projects 
can pass to their areas of specialization. 
HOMER E.NEWELL 
Associate Administrator 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
VIII 
MENT 
HIS analysis represents the distillation of extensive investigation of T the management of two major NASA projects, Surveyor and Lunar 
Orbiter. In  its present form, the report reflects the comments and criticism 
of many NASA officials who had responsibility for various aspects of these 
projects as well as the observations of many persons outside NASA who are 
knowledgeable about these two projects and the general field of project 
management. The number of people interviewed and consulted is far too 
great to permit individual acknowledgment. Seldom do so many contribute 
SO much to a manuscript of such slender proportions. 
The author owes special debts to James E. Webb, the Administrator 
of NASA when Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter projects were being con- 
ducted, whose perceptions of management and administration were an 
especially invaluable resource; to Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate Admin- 
istrator of NASA, who headed the Office of Space Science and Applica- 
tions which w a s  responsible for the projects; to David Williamson, Jr., 
Assistant Associate Administrator, whose thorough critiques served to 
illuminate and refine the manuscript throughout; to Benjamin Milwitzky, 
the former NASA program manager of Surveyor who devoted many hours 
to reconstructing the details concerning Surveyor; and to Captain Lee R. 
Scherer, the former Lunar Orbiter program manager. The Langley 
Research Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory facilitated the author's 
interviews at each of those locations as did the two prime contractor 
companies, The Boeing Co. and Hughes Aircraft Co. Colleagues on the 
staiT of the National Academy of Public Administration who were particu- 
larly helpful in reviewing the many metamorphoses of t h i s  document 
include the Executive Director, George A. Graham; the Associate Execu- 
tive Director, Roy W. Crawley; and two Senior Research Associates, 
Richard L. Chapman and Neil Hollander. 
ERASMUS H. KLOMAN 
Senior Research Associate 
National Academy of 
Public Administration 
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INTRODUCTION 
The venture into space is meaningless unless it coincides with a 
certain interior expansion, an ever growing universe within, to 
correspond with the far flight of the galaxies our telescopes follow 
from without. 
Loren Eiseley 
Unexpected Universe, 1969 
NE of the valuable byproducts of the U.S. space program is the body 0 of knowledge concerning management of large complex develop- 
ment project activities. The brief span of years since the formation of 
NASA has witnessed the rapid evolution of a variety of systems and 
techniques for directing the combined efforts of thousands of individuals 
cooperating in closeknit programs in which Government, university, and 
private industry play mutually reinforcing roles. Many of the major 
learning experiences, such as those in the Apollo management system, 
have been applied to other activities within NASA. There has been only 
limited effort, however, to distill the generalized management experience 
gained in other NASA projects for application outside the space agency 
itself. 
In  recognition of the need for continuous improvement and refine- 
ment of management techniques, NASA commissioned the National 
Academy of Public Administration to conduct a study of the management 
of the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter projects, two of the major NASA 
precursors of the Apollo program. The study was designed to provide an 
analytical record supplementing the relatively limited case literature on 
the practical aspects of such management activity. An objective record of 
the significant milestones in the management of these two endeavors, it 
was felt, would help to inform both managers currently engaged in such 
activity and those who will assume such responsibilities in the future. 
Much of what follows will appear as a statement of the rather 
obvious virtues of common sense. The history of Surveyor and Lunar 
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Orbiter, like most such studies, serves primarily as a confirmation of old 
truths about the so-called basic principles of management rather than a 
revelation of new ones. But the history brings out rather sharply that the 
application of basic principles may not always be a straightforward 
matter. I t  illustrates that what may be one man’s basic principle may be 
another’s shibboleth. Old truths are not always easily recognized or 
acknowledged. The aim of this study was, as Harold Orlans has written 
concerning the function of applied social research, “not to discover the 
truth (which historians will continue to debate for centuries), but rather 
to change the distribution of knowledge and opinion, informing a wider 
circle of what a few people already know and believe.” 
In  recapitulating the events of these two lunar exploration endeavors 
and trying to extrapolate from them the main object lessons, we should 
not make the mistake of dismissing the obvious as irrelevant. Even among 
the skilled and highly motivated professionals working toward common 
goals, as in the case of both Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter, the evidence 
suggests that no manager can definitely rely on his counterparts or 
colleagues to do the obvious. What seems obvious to one person may seem 
anything but obvious to others. 
This survey reveals that the solutions to management problems which 
now seem so clear cut were not so apparent when, for example, the 
managers responsible for Surveyor were seeking to bring that program 
out of serious trouble. Indeed, many of Surveyor’s early troubles stemmed 
from the difficulties in pinpointing some basic management problems, 
identifying their nature and causes, and facing up to the magnitude of 
necessary corrective measures. 
Early NASA experience with advanced technological development 
confirmed what was already a well-known phenomenon: the more 
complex and ambitious an undertaking, the more liable it is to encounter 
delays and overruns. To make complex high technology undertakings 
more manageable, they can be broken down into smaller elements. NASA, 
like the Department of Defense and other mission agencies, has recog- 
nized the value of setting discrete limits on projects as a means of making 
them more “doable” and thus improving the record of success. 
One of the fundamental distinctions between Surveyor and Lunar 
Orbiter, from a management viewpoint, is that the former was instituted 
as a NASA program whereas the latter was always a project. A “program,” 
in NASA terminology, is a related series of undertakings normally continu- 
ing for years to accomplish broad scientific or technical goals. Within a 
program there may be one or more “projects,” which are undertakings 
with a scheduled beginning and end involving the design, development, 
Harold Orlans, “Social Science Research Policies in the United States,” Minerva, 
IX, ( 1 )  (Jan. 1971) ,  30. 
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and demonstration of major advanced hardware items such as launch 
vehicles or space vehicles. NASA program managers located in the major 
Headquarters program offices exercise a staff coordinating and control 
function over programs. In  the field, project offices are located in NASA 
field centers under the direction of field managers. 
As the time chart indicates, Surveyor origins trace back to 1959. 
At that time it was conceived as a large, ambitious, and almost open-ended 
undertaking devoted to the pursuit of lunar science and exploration. In  
the fourth year after its initiation and after a great deal of deliberation 
among opposing elements within NASA, Surveyor was curtailed to an 
Apollo-supporting project. Lunar Orbiter, on the other hand, was desig- 
nated from the beginning as a single project to obtain data for Apollo. 
In  this kind of an analysis, one is confronted immediately with the 
question of what constitutes success in a program or project. There is 
no universally accepted set of criteria for measuring the success of research 
and development undertakings or the performance of those who manage 
them. Obviously a great deal hinges on such nonquantifiable factors as 
the degree of technical difficulty, the relative point in technological 
development at which a project is undertaken, the management philos- 
ophy guiding the sponsoring agency, and the overall environment in 
which a project operates. Comparisons based on the ratio of final costs 
to initial estimates are hazardous. There are many reasons both for and 
against overoptimism at the various levels where estimates are made, by 
the contractor, the field center, the NASA program office, or senior levels 
of NASA management. All such factors have a bearing on the reliability 
of cost estimates and should be taken into consideration when using costs 
as a measure of performance. 
In  these two projects, the United States acquired means of operating 
in space with both machines and men. The unmanned vehicles preceded 
the manned vehicles. Surveyor was the first long-lived NASA vehicle to 
land on and reduce uncertainties about the surface of a large body of 
matter other than the Earth. Within a few years of the first Surveyor 
landing, Dr. Frank Press, one of our country’s most noted geologists, 
was willing to assert, “We have already learned more about the Earth 
by going to the Moon than we have by any other experiment performed 
on Earth.” 
On the basis of the technological challenge involved, Surveyor and 
Lunar Orbiter rank as two of the outstanding accomplishments of NASA 
and the U.S. aerospace industry in preparing the way for Apollo. Sur- 
veyor’s task was far more difficult and complex than that of Lunar 
Orbiter. One of the major technological hurdles that had to be overcome 
in accomplishing the Surveyor objectives was the development of a new 
’ Oran W. Nicks, ed., v. This Island Earth, NASA SP-250, 1970, p. 64. 
4 UNMANNED SPACE PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
NASA 
ORGAN I - 
ZATION 
AND 
MENT 
MANAGE- 
CENTAUR 
RANGER 
SURVEYOR 
A POLL0 
LUNAR ORBITER 
J.E.WEBB 
2nd NASA FIRST 
1 
NASA 
OPERATIONAL ADMINIS- REORGAN- 
I 1 I TRATOR I IZATlON 
MANUAL 
4-1-1 I MSFC TRANSFER .TO NASA 
PROGRAM 
START RANGERS 1-5 
I APOiLO-SATURN I I DX PRIORITY 
I 
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S 
SPEECH CALLING FOR 
MANNED LUNAR LANDING 
I I 
Time chart of program events. 
INTRODUCTION 5 
- 
REORGANIZATION 
6 UNMANNED SPACE PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
launch vehicle capability. The Centaur, based on a liquid-hydrogen/liquid- 
oxygen concept which had yet to be proven, was to be the second stage 
of the Surveyor launch vehicle. The eventual success of the Atlas/Centaur 
combination, although its many development problems adversely affected 
Surveyor, marked the achievement of a significant new propulsion capa- 
bility serving the needs of a variety of space programs. 
When this study was begun, the Apollo space spectaculars had 
already established new records and achievement in the organization and 
management of both programs and projects. But Apollo’s success was 
dependent on technical data acquired through Surveyor and Lunar 
Orbiter, among other NASA precursors, and in no way diminishes their 
significance. Most of the technologies developed in the two projects have 
yet to be superseded in their respective fields. Moreover, in the area of 
systems management, the experience gained in these two endeavors 
promises to be prologue to the future management of similar endeavors. 
Research for this study placed a premium on the personal opinions 
of individual participants. We took a cue from the view advanced by 
Prof. Jay Forrester, of the Sloan School of Management that “snooping 
around can get you 100 times as much useful information as looking 
through official records.” Most of the management personnel who 
directed the two projects considered in this study were readily accessible 
and entirely sympathetic to the objectives of this study. More than 100 
of these managers participated in interviews that probed their views on 
the significant lessons learned. In their individual careers, these two 
projects represented high-water marks of challenge and accomplishment. 
Reporting the learning experience gained in these projects was 
complicated, nevertheless, by the fact that nearly all of the participating 
organizations and individuals continue to be actively engaged in similar 
activities. Analysis of current history always confronts the analyst with 
the difficulty of full, candid reporting of interpretations and opinions that 
may still be distorted by proximity and at the same time safeguarding 
the subject’s right to privacy. In trying to strike the correct balance, the 
author’s aim was a constructive brand of criticism which would not impair 
future relationships between individuals or institutions. 
Sharp contrasts marked the environments in which Surveyor and 
Lunar Orbiter operated. Surveyor was begun at an early stage in the 
national space program before the commitment to a manned lunar landing. 
Lunar Orbiter, on the other hand, had the benefit of three critical years 
of experience after the initiation of Surveyor, and was designed to support 
Apollo from the beginning. The management styles exhibited under such 
dissimilar circumstances had to differ. But the contrast provides an 
George A. W. Boehm. “Inventor. Engineer. Heretic. Jay Forrester,” Think, 36 
(2 )  (Mar.-Apr. v. 1970), 18. 
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opportunity to test certain management lessons in two differing environ- 
ments. 
The two projects were paired together for this analysis largely because 
of the many sharp contrasts in their two histories. Surveyor’s success 
depended upon overcoming many unforeseen technical problems of serious 
proportions. The endeavor eventually required a time-consuming and 
costly upgrading of organization and management to assure mission ful- 
fillment. Lunar Orbiter, although it was by no means without its problems, 
progressed for the most part according to plan. Its objectives were 
achieved almost by “playing it by the book.” 
The differences in the two endeavors make a comparison in terms 
of any standard of success very difficult. For example, although the Lunar 
Orbiter project had a better record of vehicle successes and was operated 
with a substantially smaller cost escalation than the Surveyor program, it 
is true that Surveyor met all of its reduced level goals and was technically 
much more complex and ambitious. Thus, a conventional comparative 
approach was not useful for this study. Instead of comparing organiza- 
tional behavior as determinants of program effectiveness, this study exam- 
ined the range of interrelationships between organizational behavior and 
factors emanating from outside the project. Perhaps one of the most 
important lessons emerging from this investigation is, in fact, that 
management is only one of the ingredients that determine final results. 
Comparisons that fail to consider other factors can be misleading. 
The 12 points discussed in the following pages represent a summa- 
tion of the broad learning experiences gained. Each of the many indi- 
viduals engaged in the two projects carried away his own personal collec- 
tion of precepts. No two individuals would be likely to agree completely 
on a retrospective analysis of what was most important or significant. 
When an outside observer looks at the two projects together, how- 
ever, he is struck by the remarkable convergence in the lessons to be 
learned from two distinct sets of events. The implications of what emerges 
from looking at two quite dissimilar types of experience tend to be 
mutually reinforcing and corroborative. Whereas the Surveyor lessons in- 
clude many illustrations of how “not to” set out on a project or how to 
correct for early misdirections, Lunar Orbiter shows how sound precepts 
and directions from the beginning can keep a project on track. One of 
the keys to the success of Lunar Orbiter was the learning experience 
gained from Surveyor. 
Considerable attention has been given in recent years to the question 
of how NASA’s collective management experience could be most effectively 
applied to tackling Earth problems. Many of the institutions and people 
engaged in Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter and other lunar and space ex- 
ploration projects have moved into nonspace activities. So far, it has 
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generally appeared easier to transfer technology than management. NASA, 
as an organization, has made extensive use of the project approach to get- 
ting jobs done. But many of today’s big social problems are not and cannot 
be wrapped up in a single project package. When a problem is selected as 
appropriate for a project-type effort, the success of the endeavor will 
hinge a great deal on the sponsoring agency’s maturity and sophistication 
in project organization and management. NASA and the aerospace 
industry have developed understanding and competence in project endeav- 
ors that are not necessarily duplicated in domestic agencies. 
Furthermore, there is a limit to the potential of technical and 
technological competence in dealing with Earth problems. A demonstra- 
tion model of an urban mass transit system, for example, can be designed 
and built to reduce substantially the transportation problems in a given 
community or type of community ; but the determination of what system 
to build and how to go about developing it must take into account a wide 
range of social, political, and economic issues. Hardware oriented tech- 
nicians cannot resolve these issues on their own. There must be an edu- 
cational process in which the “hard’’ scientists and the social scientists 
learn to communicate in each other’s languages, before the former’s com- 
petence can be brought to bear on nonspace domestic problems. 
The following pages demonstrate the importance of human aspects 
of management : relationships between individuals, compatibility, team- 
work, and informal communications. When aerospace managers move into 
nonspace or civil activities, they must establish new sets of relationships 
with new people. Aerospace managers are accustomed to an environment 
in which decisions must be forced into go or no-go channels largely on the 
basis of measurable physical, financial, and time considerations. It is far 
more difficult to come by such hard quantitative measurements in social 
problem-solving activities. The aerospace manager may find it difficult to 
adjust to terrain that does not lend itself to precise measurement. Al- 
though the kinds of basic lessons to be learned from such projects as 
Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter are certainly not confined to the domain of 
the advanced-technology enterprise, it is essentially limited to project-type 
endeavors. What is most needed now is a means of expanding the area of 
common ground between the physical and the social sciences in which 
the project approach can be utilized to optimum effect. 
SURVEYOR 
HE Surveyor program was an effort to explore the Moon with an 
automated, soft-landing spacecraft equipped to respond to commands from 
the Earth and transmit scientific and engineering data from the lunar 
surface. In  addition to mastering the difficult techniques of making a soft 
landing, the overall objectives eventually included the acquisition of basic 
data to support the ApoPo program and the performance of operations 
designed to contribute new scientific information about the Moon. 
NASA Headquarters assigned the Surveyor program to the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) 
in Pasadena in the spring of 1960. JPL had then been affiliated with 
NASA only a little more than a year, having been transferred to the space 
agency from the Department of the Army. Unlike NASA field centers, 
JPL was brought into association with NASA by means of a NASA 
contract with Caltech that included what came to be called a “mutuality 
clause” regarding the scope of the laboratory’s activities. 
During its 14-year relationship with the Department of the Army, 
JPL had concentrated on technical undertakings that were conducted 
largely in-house. I t  had managed two Army missile projects by means of 
industrial conbacting, but nothing on the scale of Surveyor; and Head- 
quarters favored contracting with industry for the development of the 
Surveyor spacecraft system. JPL conducted a study in 1960 to establish 
the overall objectives, feasibility, and design constraints applicable to the 
Surveyor mission. Pursuant to this study, JPL initiated requests from a 
large segment of industry with the intent of contracting for several funded 
preliminary design studies. A Source Evaluation Board was established 
to review these studies and select a spacecraft systems contractor. The JPL 
board recommended the selection of Hughes Aircraft Co. of Los Angeles, 
and NASA Headquarters concurred in this selection after its own review. 
9 
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All through the first half of the Surveyor program, JPL was deeply 
involved in the Ranger project to launch a series of spacecraft for hard 
landings on the lunar surface. Overcoming problems that led to a series of 
failures in that project absorbed a large share of JPL’s energies and 
resources. Eventually NASA Headquarters became deeply involved in 
Ranger through review boards and other efforts to instill engineering 
discipline in JPL. For JPL senior management, Surveyor created a 
troublesome conflict of priorities. Like NASA field centers, JPL operated 
under rigid manpower ceilings imposed by Headquarters. Even after 
NASA Headquarters had directed JPL to accord a high-priority status 
to Surveyor, the Laboratory continued to allocate limited manpower and 
support to the program. The senior administration of NASA Headquarters 
and the principal managers of the Office of Space Science and Applica- 
tions, responsible for unmanned spaceflights including Surveyor, found it 
extremely difficult to deal with senior representatives of Caltech and 
JPL, who were considered unresponsive to Washington’s directions. 
Particularly critical to Surveyor was the need for concurrent in- 
novation in the development of a new launch vehicle and a new spacecraft 
incorporating a highly sophisticated terminal descent guidance system. 
NASA consciously made Surveyor totally dependent on a highly advanced, 
yet-to-be-developed launch vehicle, the Atlas/Centaur, whose management 
was transferred to the space agency from the Department of Defense. 
Military and space mission requirements differed, and the Surveyor space- 
craft would be Earth-bound if Centaur did not meet its performance 
requirements. When an open-ended project, such as Surveyor, was as- 
signed to an open-ended launch vehicle, troubles were created for both. 
Centaur’s development was greatly complicated by performance require- 
ments on the booster that were incompatible with each other. From the 
viewpoint of the space program as a whole, the gamble paid off, but it 
greatly complicated and hindered development of Surveyor. 
For the first half of the Surveyor program, serious doubts persisted 
about when, if ever, the Centaur booster would be ready to fly. Estimates 
of the weight-lifting capability of the launch vehicle fluctuated greatly, 
and mostly downward, despite pressures to push the spacecraft weight 
upward. The design of the Surveyor spacecraft and its payload had to be 
constantly modified. As it turned out, most of the Centaur weight-lifting 
projections were too conservative, and much of the time and expense in- 
volved in spacecraft weight-reduction programs could have been avoided. 
Surveyor provided a forcing mechanism for the development of 
Centaur as part of the space agency’s long-range launch vehicle program. 
Centaur has since proved a highly valuable propulsion vehicle for a 
number of U.S. space vehicles. However, this technique for forcing inno- 
vation stretched out timetables and increased expenditures for Surveyor. 
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Both the Surveyor and Centaur projects encountered technical and 
managerial problems of sufficient magnitude to become the subject of 
extensive congressional hearings. Each was subject to an exceptional 
degree of Headquarters intervention and involvement of representatives 
of senior management in day-to-day management of the project. 
After beginning as an ambitious long-range science-oriented program, 
Surveyor was curtailed in the fall of 1964 to a discrete Apollo-support 
project. The first Surveyor spacecraft was launched on May 30, 1966. I t  
made the first U.S. soft landing on the Moon and sent back photographs 
and other data from the lunar surface. Seven Surveyor spacecraft were 
launched over an 18-month period. Five successfully landed and returned 
engineering and scientific data essential for the first manned landing. 
LUNAR ORBITER 
The Lunar Orbiter project was an element of NASA’s Lunar and 
Planetary Program and was focused on the requirements for Apollo from 
its inception. Along with the Surveyor assignment, NASA had originally 
requested JPL to explore the possibility of a dual-mission project in which 
the Surveyor soft-landing vehicle and an orbiter would both use the 
Atlas/Centaur launch vehicle. At that time JPL’s resources were so fully 
committed to Ranger, Surveyor, and in-house activity that it was unable 
to devote a great deal of time to an orbiter. Nevertheless, the orbiter 
mission studies conducted by JPL contributed significantly to the develop- 
ment of concepts that were ultimately adopted in the Lunar Orbiter 
design. 
Senior management at NASA Headquarters debated at length 
whether an agency center rather than JPL should be assigned respn- 
sibility for management of a lunar project and the development of the 
specialized competence entailed. Recognizing that some duplication might 
be necessary and desirable, Headquarters authorized Langley Research 
Center in Hampton, Va., to investigate the feasibility of its undertaking 
a possible assignment from NASA of a major flight project of the scope 
of Lunar Orbiter. LaRC management deliberated carefully and concluded 
that it would be able to handle such a mission. The Center was very 
receptive to the challenge of its first spaceflight project. The objective 
was to carry out a series of five launches of lunar-orbiting spacecraft to 
be propelled not by the Atlas/Centaur but by the smaller and proven 
Atlas/Agena launch vehicle. The major goal was to photograph potential 
landing sites for Apollo. 
The source evaluation process for Lunar Orbiter led to selection of 
a design proposed by The Boeing Co. of Seattle, Wash. Although this 
choice was criticized because it involved a relatively complex and costly 
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camera and spacecraft configuration, NASA Headquarters was convinced 
that the Boeing design was the one that would best assure fulfillment of 
the mission. The selection was justified in the ultimate performance of the 
Lunar Orbiter spacecraft. 
The first of the five successful Lunar Orbiters was launched in 
August 1966, only two months later than the original target date. All of 
the photographic requirements for Apollo were essentially satisfied in the 
first three Lunar Orbiter missions, and missions four and five were 
reoriented to acquire other photography desired by the scientific 
community. 
I1 
Summary 
HE following summary represents the principal findings emerging 
from the analysis of the management of the two projects. 
ENVIRONMENT 
The environment in which a project operates is not separable from 
the project but an integral part of it. Ability to understand and operate 
under changing environmental factors is a critical element of project 
management. Managers at all organizations involved in a project must 
be highly sensitive to environmental factors and able to adapt to the 
fast pace of environmental change. Within their respective organizations, 
project managers must make correct judgments on such delicate questions 
as when to work through the established chain of command and when 
to go outside channels for specific objectives. 
ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS 
The choice of individuals to head programs or projects is of critical 
importance. Individual managers serve as the principal conduits of previ- 
ous learning experience. I t  is difficult to specify precisely the types of 
qualifications that are most important in the makeup of individual mana- 
gers. Differing types of management styles can work equally well in direct- 
ing a project team. However, both the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter 
experiences, from two very different angles, strongly underline the import- 
ance of human skills, interpersonal compatibility, and relationships based 
on mutual respect and confidence. Project organization places a premium 
on top-level leadership. But there is also a premium on reciprocation of 
trust both vertically and laterally throughout the organization. 
TEAM WORK 
Teamwork is a vital ingredient in the conduct of programs and 
13 
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projects. Lunar Orbiter benefited from a strong sense of teamwork within 
both the customer and contractor organizations and in their relations with 
each other. Surveyor was handicapped by the lack of an equivalent sense 
of teamwork, particularly in the early years of thc program. Senior 
management was committed to full support of the Lunar Orbiter project 
and was personally involved in overall direction at both the NASA field 
center and in the prime contractor’s organization. There was far less 
support and involvement in the case of Surveyor. 
DEFINITION OF ROLES ANI) MISSIONS 
Although clear definition of the respective roles and missions of 
organizations participating in a given undertaking is conducive to smooth 
operation, it is not likely that such roles and missions will remain 
constant or static. Good project management will be responsive to the 
need for some latitude in modifying roles and missions and supplementing 
prescribed formal relationships by informal links. 
MAINTAINING ORIGINAL OB,JECTIVES 
The Lunar Orbiter experience bears out the positive value of com- 
mitment throughout all organizations involved in a project to fulfilling 
objectives within a set time and specified resource limits. Lunar Orbiter 
managers were dedicated to building and flying the original hardware 
design while restricting change to the minimum. The Surveyor and 
Centaur experiences, conversely, illustrate that if you do not control 
change, you can expect schedule delays and cost escalation. 
ORGANIZATION 
The Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter undertakings with project-type 
organizations, although they were very different, both bear out the 
importance of the right mix of managerial and technical competence at 
top project management levels. Each experience confirms the importance 
of adequate support from the matrix organization within which the 
project operates. Locating project staff together in a central facility 
proved to be highly beneficial from the outset in the Lunar Orbiter 
offices at Langley Research Center and the Boeing Co. Similar benefits 
were derived when Surveyor project offices were collocated at the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory and Hughes Aircraft Co. 
SYSTEMS CAPABILITY 
A strong systems management capability at the top levels of a project 
office is a critical element of project staffing. Those who manage a project 
need the kind of understanding and perspective that permits them to 
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see the interrelationships between the various elements of a project and 
the impact that change in one system has on other systems. 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Careful consideration should be given at the outset of a technical 
development undertaking to the adoption of workable management systems 
based on a well-defined work breakdown structure mutually agreed upon 
between the customer and the contractor. The customer should not 
impose systems that are beyond the ability of a contractor to follow. Care 
should be taken to avoid unnecessary redundancy. Although effective 
reliability and failure reporting systems are important, no formal com- 
munications systems will replace the dynamic system of personal and 
informal relations between key members of a project team. 
ROLE OF HEADQUARTERS 
Relatively few NASA projects have been subject to the depth of 
Headquarters intervention that was felt necessary in Surveyor and Centaur 
to resolve problems encountered in those two related undertakings. In both 
cases, Headquarters decisions contributed to many of the basic difficulties 
that had to be overcome, and therefore only Headquarters intervention 
could have effected the necessary redirection of the projects. The Lunar 
Orbiter experience, on the other hand, demonstrated how well the 
NASA Headquarters-field center-contractor relationship can work under 
the most favorable circumstances. 
INCENTIVE CONTRACTING 
Both Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter contracting broke new ground 
for NASA in experimenting with contract incentives. Administration of 
the Surveyor contract was greatly complicated by the many changes in 
the scope of the project and specific missions assigned to the spacecraft. 
Converting the contract from a cost-plus-fixed-fee to a cost-plus-incentive- 
fee basis at a late date in the project, although it involved a massive 
conversion effort, greatly facilitated effective administration of the con- 
tract. The Lunar Orbiter contract was the first major NASA flight project 
contract to be awarded on an incentive basis. I t  gave the agency some 
useful insights on the merits as well as the limitations of this type of 
contract. 
COST PERFORMANCE 
Total Surveyor project costs finally came to about four times the 
original estimate while the Lunar Orbiter final costs were about twice 
the initial projection. Surveyor took two years longer to complete than 
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originally planned, whereas Lunar Orbiter was completed within two 
months of schedule. The wide differences in the environments surround- 
ing the two projects and the much more difficult technical challenge 
involved in Surveyor account for much of the difference in cost 
perf ormance. 
SCIENCE/ENGINEERING RELATIONS 
NASA Headquarters allowed the Surveyor science payload to be 
subject to major change in composition and configuration until a late 
state in the project. This caused problems for the Jet Propulsion Labora- 
tory and Hughes Aircraft Co. Scientists and engineers were intentionally 
kept at arms length from each other in the early stages of Surveyor. When, 
later, they formed closer working relationships, they had more success in 
finding solutions to problems in science experiment design. Lunar Orbiter, 
as an Apollo-support project, involved relatively little science except that 
which was added on the last two flights. There was therefore far less 
potential for trouble in the science/engineering interface. 
ENVIRONMENT 
ROM a management viewpoint, the greatest contrast between the F Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter projects was the nature of the relation- 
ships of participating organizations, or what might be called the institu- 
tional environment. For Surveyor, there was an unusual degree of conflict 
and friction between Headquarters, JPL, and the prime contractor. For 
Lunar Orbiter, harmony and teamwork prevailed. Institutions and people 
worked together in a spirit of mutual respect. 
Obviously one cannot generalize from these two experiences on 
whether harmony or disharmony is more conducive to innovation and the 
successful management of complex technical projects. What does emerge 
from the Surveyor and other similar undertakings is that, once engendered, 
mistrust lingers, coloring the relationships between organizations well 
after a project has been completed. The manner in which Headquarters, 
JPL, Hughes, Langley, and Boeing perceive each other still reflects to a 
considerable degree the impact of the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter 
experiences. 
The differences in the institutional environment of Surveyor and 
Lunar Orbiter trace back to the different origins of the two centers and 
the two prime contractors engaged. Each pair of organizers was character- 
ized by distinctive institutional personalities which influenced relations 
with their outside worlds. 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, having entered into its contractual 
relationship with NASA only a short time before the assignment of 
Surveyor, was still new to the ways of the space agency. Langley Research 
Center, on the other hand, was the oldest of the field centers affiliated 
with NASA’s predecessor organization, the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics. LaRC had been the leading US. center for aeronautical 
research since its formation only 14 years after the Wright brothers’ 
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flight. Its senior managers had established close and effective working 
relationships with their counterparts in nearby Washington, and NASA 
had given Langley a mission of basic and applied research encompassing 
the entire range of aerospace programs, both manned and unmanned. 
JPL was a leading research and development center in rocketry and 
missile systems. As it moved into unmanned space exploration, JPL had 
the difficult task of converting its capabilities to the complex multisystem 
requirements for space hardware development. The conversion involved 
major manpower training and redirection. 
JPL was accustomed to a high degree of autonomy. Its professional 
preeminence had bred a strongly independent attitude and a good deal 
of skepticism concerning more recently formed organizations, including 
NASA. Its management was quite understandably intent on preserving 
the scientific and engineering creativity and the independence of its 
talented staff. 
Like the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) headed by Dr. 
Wernher von Braun at Huntsville, Ala., JPL was oriented toward the 
“in-house” approach to development. JPL and ABMA (which became the 
Marshall Space Flight Center) enjoyed good working relationships with 
each other, developed largely through their association as the Army 
team responsible for the first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1, launched in 1958. 
The two centers had come to share a certain antipathy toward Air Force 
and Navy approaches to missile development which relied heavily on 
industrial contracting. Although the high degree of technological innova- 
tion needed in Surveyor development appealed to JPL’s interest in pushing 
the s,tate of the art, serving as a monitor of an industrial contract weak- 
ened JPL’s enthusiasm for the program. 
Relations between NASA Headquarters and JPL at the senior ad- 
ministration levels were strained from the beginning. In the early 1960’s, 
Administrator Webb and his principal associates, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden 
and Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr., became deeply concerned about failures 
on Ranger, the JPL in-house project for a hard-landing lunar probe. A 
congressional inquiry into Ranger, following two high-level NASA reviews, 
spotlighted some basic weaknesses, including an inadequate system of pre- 
flight testing, a reflection on past technical judgments. By the spring of 
1964, when NASA instituted an intensive review of Surveyor, Headquar- 
ters/ JPL relations were under severe stress. 
The more Headquarters increased its monitoring of JPL projects, 
the more JPL resented what it regarded as an intrusion on its professional 
independence. The Headquarters outlook toward JPL was anything but 
homogeneous because of the differing views at differing levels-the 
Administrator and his associates and the program offices, particularly ,the 
Office of Space Science and Applications and its subdivisions having 
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special responsibility for Surveyor. Headquarters did not present a single 
institutional front in its relationship with the field, and it was difFicu1.t for 
the field to sort out what seemed quite often to be rather wide diver- 
gences. Differences between JPL and Headquarters, moreover, were 
accentuated as Headquarters began increasingly to concentrate interest 
and resources on manned flight and the Apollo program. This emphasis 
was not easily reconciled with the long-standing Caltech/ JPL commitment 
to unmanned space exploration. Such environmental influences operated 
against good communications and teamwork on the Surveyor project. 
A very different situation prevailed in ‘the case of Lunar Orbiter. 
LaRC is close to Washington, and person-to-person communications be- 
tween Lunar Orbiter personnel in Headquarters and the field center could 
be maintained with relative ease. LaRC’s managers looked long and hard 
at the Lunar Orbiter program before they undertook it. They accepted 
the assignment with full commitment and a determination to make it 
succeed. The management placed great store in its reputation for fulfilling 
every mission it set out to accomplish. In reporting to the Headquarters 
Office of Space Science and Applications, LaRC made no effort to hold 
back information concerning problems that arose. OSSA reciprocated 
with full cooperation and support. For all of these reasons, the institutional 
environment surrounding Lunar Orbiter was favorable to teamwork. 
Just as there were marked differences between the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and Langley Research Center, two very distinctive types of 
corporations served as prime contractors for the respective programs- 
Hughes Aircraft Co. for Surveyor and the Boeing Company for Lunar 
Orbiter. The overall experience of Hughes was, in many respects, more 
relevant to a spacecraft development project than that of Boeing. Hughes’ 
design engineers were recognized for their highly creative talents. But 
the newly formed Aerospace Group, in which a skeletal Surveyor project 
staff was located, had limited experience in the management of a complex 
systems undertaking or in production techniques. For the first several 
years Hughes Surveyor managers found it difficult to obtain the degree 
of support and assistance that the project required from other Hughes 
divisions. 
The Boeing Company’s organizational approach to the Lunar 
Orbiter project was quite different. I t  had accumulated years of experi- 
ence as a major contractor for production of airplanes and aeronautical 
equipment. I t  was familiar with the exacting requirements of systems 
development. Corporate management was highly sensitive and responsive 
to requirements imposed by the contractual relationship with a Federal 
Government agency. 
When Surveyor was undertaken, the U.S. space program was still 
a very young enterprise. Soviet successes in space, beginning with Sputnik 
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1 in October 1957, had produced strong pressures in Washington to 
demonstrate American technological ability to catch up with and surpass 
the U.S.S.R. The Surveyor program felt the direct impact of these 
pressures. 
It meant many different things to different people. Almost everyone 
involved, however, saw it as a major program stretching out over a long 
period and involving several blocks of spacecraft, each for increasingly 
complex and difficult missions. Managing the program was greatly com- 
plicated by the various mutations through which Surveyor passed as it was 
stripped down to a discrete project dedicated to the support of Apollo. 
During the three critical years between the startup of Surveyor and 
the startup of Lunar Orbiter, the U.S. space program matured and 
settled down somewhat. NASA Headquarters/field center relationships 
went through two major reorganizations. The Lunar Orbiter project was 
the beneficiary of a tremendous effort on the part of NASA Headquarters 
to develop organizational forms and machinery conducive to effective 
management. Lunar Orbiter managers could take advantage of what 
had been learned from Surveyor about techniques and systems of project 
management. Both NASA Headquarters and the field center applied 
directly the lessons from Surveyor to the management of Lunar Orbiter. 
As an agency, NASA has striven to overcome the temptation to 
filter the feedback of critical information on past performance. Openness 
to constructive criticism was espoused. As James E. Webb has observed 
on the basis of his experience as NASA Administrator, the management 
of today’s large-scale enterprises places a premium on flexibility and 
adaptation. A continuous and often turbulent process of interaction 
between a large-scale enterprise and its environment is to be expected, 
and flexibility in organizational structure is necessary to ride out environ- 
mental disturbances. Effective adaptation, in turn, depends upon the effec- 
tiveness of the feedback process.4 
Environment is not something apart from, but an integral part of, 
a project. An effective manager needs to be sensitive and responsive to 
change in the environment, particularly the kinds of change that alter 
existing organizational relationships or the relationship between one 
project and another. 
Although the individual manager who moves from one project to 
another serves as the most efficient carrier of learning experience, NASA 
fosters the feedback process through manuals and guidelines reflecting past 
experience. Emerging from both the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter projects 
were a number of documents and reports applicable to future project 
James E. Webb, Space Age Management: The  Large Scale Approach, McKinsey 
Foundation Lecture Series, sponsored by the Graduate School of Business, Columbia 
Univ. (McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 142-146. 
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activity. These included NASA publications such as a report on the 
Surveyor failure reporting systcm, an article on technology transfer in the 
Surveyor project by thc JPL projcct manager, and numerous reports and 
papers on various aspects of Lunar Orbiter. 
At the conclusion of a project, contractor organizations often con- 
duct critiques of their own performance. Although such critiques may 
cnntain a high degrce of proprietary content, it would be beneficial to 
the fccdbacl; process if such reports, or at least modified versions of them, 
made a\ailablr to NASA upon completion of a project. After the 
conclusion of Lunar Orbitrr, the prime contractor and onc of the major 
stibcontractors made ~ u c l i  critiques available to NASA, but the Surveyor 
priine Contractor chose not to release to NASA its own internal critical 
analysis. 
ROLE OF INI)IVIDUALS 
All the principal managers in NASA's Office of Space Science and 
Applications with responsibility for Lunar Orbitcr had also been involved 
in the management of Surveyor. Perhaps the most significant transfer of 
learning cxpcrience took place among those individuals. At the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, a number of key managers of the Space Flight 
Operations Facility, and the D c ~ p  Space Instrumentation Facility for 
Lunar Orbiter, were also able to make direct use of what had been 
learned from Surveyor. Langlcy Research Center management learned 
\kariously from the Surveyor experience. The Boeing Co., the prime 
contractor for the Lunar Orbitcr spacecraft, was responsive to suggestions 
from the Government agcncy and sought to avoid repetition of mistakes. 
In  effecting a transfer of learning experience, there is no substitute 
for an individual manager as a conduit. He carries in his head what he 
has learned from one rxperience to another. The individual style and 
characteristics of managers selected to take on new assignments obviously 
have a great deal to do with how projects will be conducted. But it is 
difficult for those administering advanced-technology organizations to 
determine how managers can best be selected, trained, and rotated. 
Management analysts have yet to identify the qualifications that 
distinguish the ideal candidate for project management assignments from 
other types of managers. Indeed, a recently completed National Academy 
of Public Administration study r, found that extensive research and inter- 
views provided no scientific basis for drawing conclusions on the kinds of 
characteristics, skills, or management styles that best lend themselves to 
'Richard L. Chapman, with thc assistance of Robert H. Pontious and Lewis B. 
Barnrs, Project and Program Management in NASA: T h e  System and the Men,  
National Academy of Public Administration (Washington, 1971), pp. 165-168. 
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the responsibilities of program or project management. There is even 
more reason for caution in generalizing on such an issue on the basis of 
findings in only two undertakings. 
The Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter experience might be considered 
to lend support to the findings of the broader Academy study concerning 
the difficulty of reconciling different criteria and viewpoints in assessing 
the qualifications for project management. The Surveyor and Lunar 
Orbiter findings also support the conclusion of the broader study that 
individual personal qualities and management capabilities can at times be 
a determining influence in overall project performance. Most specifically, 
they conform with that study’s emphasis upon “human skills” as the most 
important of the principal project manager skills. The human skills, which 
center on the ability to work with others, outranked managerial, con- 
ceptual, and technical skills. 
Human skills and the ability to stimulate effective working relation- 
ships between people came much more into play in Lunar Orbiter than 
Surveyor. The latter, in fact, seems almost to have created an environment 
of its own which put relations between individuals to the severest test. 
The pressures and constraints upon Surveyor managers were hardly likely 
to foster easy cooperation and good working relationships between coun- 
terparts. Three-way friction between Headquarters, the field center, and 
the contractor posed a barrier to good interpersonal relationships. 
The impact of the personalities of managers is evident in interrela- 
tionships with both peers and subordinates. Managers undoubtedly can 
adopt many different styles to stimulate others to perform. In  the Sur- 
veyor and Lunar Orbiter experience, assuring that things got done seemed 
to depend greatly on the power to persuade and a certain ability to “wheel 
and deal.” This was particularly true in the case of the Headquarters 
program managers. Because they are nominally staff rather than line 
officials, these managers operate with a somewhat ill-defined authority 
base. They do not have what NASA calls “directive control” and must 
confine their role to advisory and monitoring functions while somehow 
assuring that the program or projects for which they are responsible 
proceed on target. Although a field center project manager has line 
responsibility, his real ability to control, like the Headquarters program 
manager’s, is heavily dependent upon his persuasive powers. Those 
powers need to be brought into play with great skill in the coordination 
of the activities of other field centers and organizations responsible for 
various subsystems. 
The compatibility of the Hcadquarters program manager with the 
field center project managers can be critical to the success of an endeavor. 
In  recent years many of the NASA field centers have come to recognize 
the importance of this relationship and take it into account in the selec- 
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tion of managers. Headquarters and its field centers now make a joint 
effort to match the personalities of the two sets of counterparts. 
Both Langley Research Center and the Boeing Co. were able to 
assign managers to Lunar Orbiter who were experienced in prior project 
activity. The top project managers at Headquarters, the field center, and 
the prime contractor organization developrd smooth-working relationships 
and highly effective communications with each other. It should be noted 
again, however, that Lunar Orbiter’s discretely defined and technically 
feasible goals subjected the institutional interfaces of that project to far 
less strain than was encountered on Surveyor. The smooth-working rela- 
tionships among various levels of top managers on Lunar Orbiter should 
probably be regarded as both contributing to and a consequence of success- 
ful technical performance. Lunar Orbiter had the advantage of second- 
generation developments in the three years after the start of the Surveyor 
program; this also contributed significantly to the high standards set by 
Lunar Orbiter. 
TEAMWORK 
The question of how to achieve good teamwork in project activity 
involves many intangibles and unquantifiable elements. The difficulty of 
identifying and measuring the ingredients of teamwork, however, in no 
way reduces the importance o€ the concept. Almost all of the Lunar 
Orbiter managers regarded teamwork as an important aspect of the 
successful management of that project. In  headquarters, the field center, 
and the prime contractor organization, project personnel regarded their 
project counterparts with respect and trust. Within both the customer and 
contractor organizations, moreover, the history of the project was marked 
by high morale and good teamwork. 
Although some sense of teamwork developed in the course of the 
Surveyor program, it grew slowly and fitfully, spurred by a sense of shared 
anxiety and concern. The many changes during the project’s early years, 
the basic question whether a launch vehicle would be ready to fly the 
spacecraft, and concomitant uncertainties about the project’s future, were 
hardly conducive to smooth interinstitutional relations. 
The positive attitude and enthusiasm of top management were con- 
tagious and infected the Lunar Orbiter project staffs. Some of Langley 
Research Center’s top talents had sought assignment on the project, con- 
sidering it a career plus. The Lunar Orbiter project organizations at both 
LaRC and the Boeing Co. were tightly knit cohesive units, yet they 
operated with full support of and in close communication with functional 
divisions. 
The conditions that prevailed for Surveyor were less favorable. The 
attitude of most JPL personnel toward a project assignment, particularly 
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one based on contract monitoring, reflected a concern for any diversion 
from recognized paths of career advancement. There was no doubt about 
the feasibility of achieving the technical objectives, but the difficulties 
were tremendous and the Surveyor project was isolated from the main- 
stream of JPL activity. These factors mitigated against recruitment for the 
Surveyor project office of some of the best qualified and most talented 
persons. 
The early Hughes organization for Surveyor was highly diffused 
throughout 13 operating divisions loosely tied to the project office. That 
office was at a level below many of the divisions on which it was depend- 
ent, and the Surveyor manager encountered great difficulty in influencing 
or controlling all project-related personnel. Senior Hughes management 
was not sufficiently involved in the project to take steps necessary to 
assure the responsiveness of divisions to project requirements. This 
was hardly an environment calculated to evoke a strong sense of unity and 
project commitment. Hughes undertook a major reorganization after 
Surveyor, to consolidate many activities needing to be under one organiz- 
ational roof for managing space project activity. 
Given the inadequacies in structural formation of the project offices 
in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Hughes Aircraft Co. on top of all 
the major technical problems besetting the program, it was not surprising 
that a reciprocal sense of teamwork was slow to develop. Nevertheless, as 
counterparts worked together, strong ties were forged. For example, the 
contract manager at JPL and his counterpart at Hughes eventually de- 
veloped a very effective working relationship. In  time, individuals on each 
side of the fence came to recognize each other’s technical competence and 
skill. With the strengthening of the project organization and the upgrad- 
ing of management enforced mainly by Headquarters during the latter 
half of the program, customer/contractor relations improved and a team 
spirit began to develop. 
DEFINITON OF ROLES AND MISSIONS 
A good deal of the theory discussed in management literature and a 
good deal of practical effort to systematize management procedures has 
been centered on early definition of various roles, missions, and responsi- 
bilities. Although a period of planning and project definition preceded 
Surveyor, efforts to carry out the plan ran afoul of many unforeseen con- 
tingencies. External influences forced the program to go through funda- 
mental changes in organizational roIes and relationships which somewhat 
vitiated the value of advanced planning. 
Quite a few observers have come to believe that a good deal of 
uncertainty is endemic to research and development activity and that 
efforts to pin down organizational roles and conform with rigid phasing 
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can be counterproductive. It is argued that too much mechanical effort 
to build in order and harmony is dysfunctional. In fact, no NASA pro- 
grams have strictly followed the Phased Project Planning Guidelines issued 
by Headquarters in 1968. The value of guidelines rests in their utility as 
points of reference rather than as inflexible standards. 
In  conforming with the Headquarters policy, both the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and Headquarters seem to have operated on the assumption 
that the designation of a spacecraft systems contractor implied turning 
over much of the technical direction of the program to the contractor, and 
Hughes found that they were not receiving what they regarded as adequate 
technical guidance from JPL. As the program encountered increasingly 
serious trouble, Headquarters actively intervened in its management. JPL 
was compelled to assign a very large monitoring staff to on-site direction 
of the program. The initially minimal technical direction was replaced 
by a massive supervisory force. Thus, in the program’s latter years, the 
responsibility for overall spacecraft development was gradually retrieved 
from Hughes by JPL, thereby altering significantly the respective roles of 
the field center and the spacecraft systems contractor. 
Somewhat parallel changes took place in the management of the 
Centaur program. General Dynamics Corp., the prime contractor for that 
program, was originally left very much on its own with a loose monitoring 
rein. When field center responsibility for the management of the program 
was assigned to Lewis Research Center in the hopes of pulling Centaur 
out of serious trouble, Lewis established firm technical control over the 
contractor; this was a major factor contributing to the successful develop- 
ment of the Centaur vehicle. Another major change in the Centaur pro- 
gram that greatly improved its prospects was the removal of requirements 
for missions other than Surveyor in the development of the booster 
capability. The initial decision by NASA Headquarters to assign such 
an open-ended project as Surveyor to an open-ended launch vehicle 
made for many complications in both spacecraft and booster development. 
Both the Surveyor and Centaur experiences suggest that, during an 
extended program, roles and responsibilities are not likely to remain fixed 
or permanent. Arrangements between customer and contractor should be 
sufficiently flexible to permit each to take advantage of its special 
strengths and abilities. Adaptive mechanisms to redefine roles and respon- 
sibilities at various stages of a program are more likely to result in high 
standards of performance than rigid adherence to a preset pattern. 
The Lunar Orbiter experience also demonstrates the positive values of 
interorganizational flexibility. Informal organizational relationships in the 
customer/contractor relationships supplemented prescribed formal links. 
Although Langley Research Center’s Lunar Orbiter project office had 
formal responsibility for “project-wide systems integration,” the Boeing 
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Co. played an important auxiliary role. With LaRC’s tacit approval, 
Boeing maintained an active monitoring role as a link with the several 
NASA field centers having a system responsibility in the program. 
MAINTAINING ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES 
Those who managed Lunar Orbiter at Headquarters, LaRC, and 
Boeing agreed fully on the importance of adhering to the original objec- 
tives. The Surveyor and other space and defense programs offered visible 
evidence of the risks inherent in changing objectives. The clear lesson 
was that if you change direction, you will pay for it. The basic objectives 
of Lunar Orbiter, to obtain data to support the Apollo program for 
landing men on the lunar surface, remained almost static. As it turned 
out, the first three Lunar Orbiter missions returned all the data necessary 
for this set of objectives, and it was possible to add a quest for data 
sought by the scientific community to the last two flights of Lunar 
Orbiter spacecraft. 
The important consideration from a management viewpoint, how- 
ever, is that work on the design and development of Lunar Orbiter 
systems and subsystems was not interrupted by a change in objectives. In  
the case of Surveyor, the composition of the science experiment payload 
had been allowed to remain open-ended until late in the program’s 
development stage. In  retrospect, it now appears that the uncertainty 
concerning the number of experiments, their weight and configuration 
proved to be one of the most serious distractions in the management of 
that program. Lunar Orbiter managers were careful to avoid this mistake. 
The Lunar Orbiter Headquarters program manager assured adherence to 
the principle of minimum change by requiring that his office give prior 
approval to negotiation of any major change affecting spacecraft design 
and overall performance. 
To  reinforce the basic commitment to hold Lunar Orbiter changes to 
the minimurn, management in both the customer and contractor organiza- 
tions adhered to rigid design review and configuration control programs. 
After hardware and equipment passed through the critical design review, 
change was restricted to absolute essentials. Early establishment of a base- 
line mission for hardware design, worked out between the Boeing Co. and 
Langley Research Center, greatly facilitated evaluation of the effect of a 
change. A change board, with representation from each major area 
involved in a proposed change, reviewed all proposals to assure that only 
the essentials were authorized. Even before referral to the board, the 
program manager or the engineering manager had to pass on the sub- 
mission of the proposed change to the board. These management tech- 
niques, together with the basic commitment to make maximum use of 
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“space proven” hardware, made it possible to develop a spacecraft that 
resembled very closely the design of the original mock-up submitted with 
the Boeing proposal to NASA. 
ORGANIZATION 
The major strengthening of organization midway in both the Sur- 
veyor and Centaur projects resulted largely from increasing the project 
staff. In  both cases, it had been assumed that the contractor could be given 
greater systems responsibility than it could exercise. In each case the cus- 
tomer and contractor organizations had started out with small staff s heavily 
dependent on their respective matrix organizations for technical support. 
Eventually, more highly “projectized” organizations incorporating all the 
necessary support functions were developed. 
The internal structure of both the customer and contractor organiza- 
tions for Surveyor went through numerous changes in form and composi- 
tion. At Hughes Aircraft Co., a major reorganization occurred on the 
average of every six months. Keeping the interface between structures of 
the customer and contractor organizations compatible required concerted 
effort. On both sides, the need for a clear-cut counterpart relationship 
between key men for every major element of project activity came to be 
recognized. 
At both JPL and Hughes the early Surveyor organizations suffered 
from the physical dispersion of the activities. Marked improvement came 
in both project organizations when project personnel were collocated in 
central facilities at JPL in Pasadena and Hughes in Los Angeles. 
The organizational forms used at Langley Research Center and at 
the Boeing Co. for the Lunar Orbiter program were well suited at all 
stages to the task at hand. LaRC adhered to its basic philosophy of 
starting out with a lean organization, essentially as Surveyor began at JPL. 
But LaRC, unlike JPL, was prepared to supplement the initial project 
staff, as needed, while also providing full support from other divisions 
of the center. 
The Boeing organization for Lunar Orbiter was highly project 
oriented from the beginning. Boeing’s management had considerable 
experience in organizing for project activity and was fully prepared to 
bring together all the manpower necessary for the Lunar Orbiter assign- 
ment. The tight schedule for the project placed a premium on efficient 
movement from one phase to the other and for adequate staffing of each 
phase. Personnel administration provided for timely transition of personnel 
from design to test and later operational phases. Test and operations 
teams worked with each spacecraft from final assembly through launch. 
The Lunar Orbiter project offices at both Langley Research Center 
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in Hampton, Va., and Boeing, in Seattle, were located from the outset 
in central facilities where project personnel could work closely together. 
Close continuing communication both within the two project organiza- 
tions and between them was a major factor contributing to the success of 
the program. 
There are no firm standards that dictate how far an organization 
should go in forming project staffs for specific undertakings. The eventual 
buildup of a very sizable Jet Propulsion Laboratory Surveyor project staff 
represented a measure that compensated for understaffing in the first half 
of the program. But the shift is open to the criticism of being an over- 
compensation, wasteful of scarce manpower. LaRC’s organization for 
Lunar Orbiter, on the other hand, remained lean and relied heavily on 
the divisional structure. Environmental considerations such as other 
projects with which participating organizations are involved, the stage 
of development of an organization, and the availability of the right types 
of project personnel influence significantly the effectiveness of any form 
of project organization. The evidence of Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter sug- 
gests that gradual restructuring and administrative flexibility are neces- 
sary to adapt to changing stages. The question of how organizational boxes 
are arranged, although important and even sometimes determining, is 
closely tied, of course, to the question of the kind of people who fill the 
boxes and, particularly, the availability of competent systems managers. 
The Hughes experience with Surveyor was one factor leading to a 
corporate reorganization in 1970. The Surveyor project organization had 
been located within the Space Systems Division of the Hughes Aerospace 
Group. Formed in 1961, the division also managed the Syncom communi- 
cations satellite project. Although the division included many of the 
technical and managerial elements necessary for managing space projects, 
it relied on laboratories centered in other divisions of the group for a 
number of technical requirements. By 1970 the division had established a 
firm business base. A special predominance in communications satellites 
had led into other aspects of space communications. The technology and 
systems management resources were then separated from the Aerospace 
Group and combined to form a new operational group, Space and Com- 
munications, to develop and manage programs in research and applica- 
tions of space technology. I t  was designed to comprise virtually all the 
resources necessary, both technical and business, to conduct these programs. 
SYSTEMS CAPABILITY 
Systems management capability was scarce when Surveyor was initi- 
ated, and few systems managers were available in either the customer or 
contractor organizations. The real strengths of both the Jet Propulsion 
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Laboratory and the Hughes Space Systems Division resided in creative 
engineering design talent and researchers in various aerospace specialties. 
Systems managers are trained and skilled in supervising the diverse 
sub-systeins of a project in accordance with a schedule to assure integration 
of the various parts of the projrct as it moves toward mission fulfillment. A 
systems manager must have the peripheral vision needed to see the totality 
of a program, and he cannot afford to focus his attention too long on 
indepth examination of special areas. He must be able to delegate to 
specialists in such a way as to assure the highest possible levels of 
performance in their respective technical areas. Two recognized speciaIists 
on systems management, David I. Cleland and William R. King, describe 
the systems manager as 
that individual who is appointed to accomplish the task of integrat- 
ing functional and extraorganizational efforts directed toward the 
development and acquisition of a specific project. The systems 
manager is confronted with a unique set of circumstances and 
forces with each project, and these circumstances and forces 
channel his thought and behavior into soinewhat singular patterns 
of response." 
Surveyor was a training ground for the development of a sizable 
number of systems managers highly qualified to apply this skill to future 
tasks. The structures of the project offices at both JPL and Hughes were 
significantly altered during the later half of the program to permit more 
effective execution of the systems management function. This strengthen- 
ing of the systems function provided better overall integration and 
represented a major element of the general upgrading of project organiz- 
ation. 
When Lunar Orbiter was initiated, more than three years after 
Surveyor, both Langlry Research Center and the Boeing Co. were fully 
conscious of the importance of systems management. Their project organ- 
izations included highly qualified systems managers located at the right 
levels. Boeing was able to assign many of the personnel from two recently 
concluded projects to Lunar Orbiter, including several highly qualified 
systems managers ; these personnel contributed greatly to the successful 
management of the program. 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
In  preparing to undertake a complex technical project, a sponsoring 
agency faces some critical questions concerning the kinds of formal report- 
ing and control systems to apply. How extensive and how detailed should 
"avid I.  Cleland and William R. King, Systems Analysis and Project Manage- 
ment (McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 12. 
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these systems be? How much information is needed at various levels of 
management? 
Everyone recognizes in principle that systematic reporting and control 
mechanisms are necessary to maintain the discipline required for advanced- 
technology projects. I t  is also widely recognized that beyond a certain 
level, formal reporting systems are wasteful, and that they are counter- 
productive when they curtail qualified managers’ freedom to make deci- 
sions. Many good managers insist on being able to make “seat of the 
pants’’ judgments without being bound by documents resulting from some 
formal reporting system. 
The Surveyor experience represents an example of an effort begun 
with too little attention at the outset to the management systems that 
would be appropriate and the measures necessary to indoctrinate and 
train personnel in their use. PERT, for example, was introduced several 
months after the project had started. PERT reporting was handicapped 
not only by its delayed introduction but also by the fact that the prime 
contractor, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and NASA Headquarters all 
had had insufficient experience in its use. Hughes Aircraft Co. was not 
prepared to give up other familiar systems altogether. Although PERT 
was useful, particularly in the program’s early stages, Hughes never fully 
relied on it for project evaluation and control. Much of the PERT 
reporting represented more pro  {orma compliance with NASA require- 
ments than effective utilization of a reporting system for project manage- 
ment. 
Surveyor’s difficulties stemmed from very fundamental causes such 
as the changes in the initial program’s nature and content and the difficult 
and complex technical requirements for all major systems, including the 
launch vehicle. No formal reporting and control systems, however effec- 
tive, could have overcome the technical difficulties. But, as technical 
problems were solved and the prospects for meeting all the requirements 
began to appear reasonable, the management systems required a massive 
upgrading. Such a substantial overhaul was necessary to assure the degree 
of rigor and discipline essential to fulfillment of the mission. The up- 
grading of these systems resulted largely from NASA Headquarters’ direct 
intervention. The Headquarters program manager played a major role 
in this process. 
As a result of intensive and laborious effort, the Surveyor manage- 
ment reporting systems became a true reflection of the state of the project, 
providing checks in great detail. A trouble and failure reporting system 
provided not only complete coverage of the technical aspects under review 
but clear identification of each individual responsible for technical 
requirements. In  the revised reporting systems, heavy emphasis was 
placed on pinpointing individual responsibility as a stimulus to improving 
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performance. Ultimately, as a result of this type of visibility, a high degree 
of rigor and discipline was injected into management systems that had 
previously been too lax and unsystematic. 
By the time Lunar Orbiter was started, NASA had made a good deal 
of progress in refining and standardizing formal reporting and control 
systems. The issuance of a revised General Management Instruction 4-1-1 
in March 1963 clarified the entire field of project organization and man- 
agement within the space agency.i 
Langley Research Center and the Boeing Co. both gave careful 
initial attention to the adaptation of reporting annd control systems to the 
project. In  contrast to Hughes’ resistance to PERT, for example, Boeing 
accepted the requirement and relied on it as the reporting and control 
system for all of its work on Lunar Orbiter. Even so, Boeing’s Lunar 
Orbiter program manager made little use of PERT in his decisionmaking. 
Rut the system was effective, on the whole, as a device for recording and 
tracking the status of the project. 
Having a great deal of experience in Government contracting that 
required extensive formal reporting and control, Boeing management 
sought from the beginning of Lunar Orbiter to keep the volume of report- 
ing from becoming excessive and the reported information from being 
unnecessarily redundant. Yet NASA reporting requirements for the project 
exceeded what Boeing considered the optimum level of detail. Midway 
in the project, Boeing was able to convince LaRC that some of the report- 
ing requirements could be discontinued, thereby reducing the cost. 
Both LaRC and Boeing took care to assure that management report- 
ing systems were updated and well maintained. Boeing sought to make 
the reports true and meaningful indicators of the state of the program. 
By keeping the reporting systems in good repair, those responsible for 
Lunar Orbiter were able to avoid the need for a massive upgrading. 
Lunar Orbiter managers made information systems come close to serving 
the basic purpose for which they were intended-to communicate the 
essential information on the state of a project to all those who needed 
to know in both the customer’s and the contractor’s organizations. 
What stands out in the Lunar Orbiter experience, however, is not the 
overriding importance of formal reporting but the optimal use of informal 
person-to-person communications. Lunar Orbiter experience corroborates 
the conclusion reached in Richard Chapman’s study: “No formal arrange- 
ment can replace the dynamic system of personal and informal relations 
developed by key members of the project team to meet that project’s 
’ NASA Management Manual, General Management Instructions Number 4-1-1, 
subject: Planning and implementation of NASA Projects (Mar. 8, 1963). This 
instruction replaced GMI 4-1-1 of Jan. 18, 1961. 
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particular needs.” * The compatibility of individual managers serving the 
customer and the contractor helped greatly to assure Lunar Orbiter‘s 
success. 
ROLE OF HEADQUARTERS 
Only rarely does a program require the extent and depth of inter- 
vention by Headquarters that occurred in the case of Surveyor. Both 
the Surveyor spacecraft and the Centaur on which it depended faced such 
serious troubles that the highest levels of Headquarters management felt 
compelled to intervene. The story of Centaur demonstrates the importance 
of decisionmaking at the Headquarters level. 
Marshall Space Flight Center was the first NASA field center to be 
assigned responsibility for Centaur after the transfer of the .program in 
1959 from the Air Force. Many factors worked against the interests of 
Centaur at MSFC. Senior management at MSFC focused its attention 
mainly on the development of the powerful Saturn launch vehicle for 
Apollo, and the demanding responsibilities for Saturn left somewhat 
limited technical and managerial resources available for Centaur. 
Before being assigned to MSFC, Centaur had gone through numerous 
changes and shifts in objectives, and there were numerous technical con- 
ff icts in the propulsion requirements represented by several different 
potential customers for a single launch vehicle. Advent, a military com- 
munications satellite project, imposed demands on Centaur that were 
incompatible with the Surveyor requirements, and a year elapsed before the 
Advent mission was deleted, 
Even after Centaur was transferred to MSFC, the Air Force 
retained responsibility for monitoring the prime contractor. In the face 
of many serious technical difficulties associated with Centaur development, 
MSFC’s top management concluded that it would not be feasible to meet 
the minimum weight-lifting requirements of Surveyor and that the program 
should be cancelled in favor of a Saturn C-l/Agena combination. The 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory concurred in the MSFC recommendation. 
Headquarters, after carefully reviewing the situation, confirmed its 
position that the Centaur concept was both technically feasible and essen- 
tial to the launch vehicle program for the space effort. It thus rejected 
the recommendation of senior management at MSFC and JPL. Responsi- 
bility for Centaur was transferred abruptly then to Lewis Research Cen- 
ter. This was interpreted as a rebuke to MSFC and a signal to the other 
centers that they could not back out of major development commitments 
assigned by Headquarters. 
On numerous occasions Headquarters felt compelled to intervene in 
Surveyor. For example, a major Headquarters investigation of the pro- 
s Op. cit. 
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gram in early 1964 uncovered many serious weaknesses in both technical 
and managerial aspects of the project and led to a series of correctional 
moves. The Headquarters review contained detailed proposals for tighten- 
ing and upgrading project organization and management both at JPL and 
at Hughes. Headquarters urged JPL to appoint a Deputy Director who 
could help in JPL administration and management while keeping an 
eye on Surveyor. A former general manager of the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission was designated by JPL to serve in a similar capacity. He instituted 
significant changes in the business administration and management prac- 
tices of JPL in general and Surveyor in particular. 
This appointment was highly charged with internal political over- 
tones. Headquarters senior administrators were dissatisfied with the general 
management at JPL and saw the difficulties encountered in Surveyor as 
an opportunity to force a change. JPL senior administrators, on the other 
hand, were skeptical of any organizational or personnel changes inspired 
by NASA. Thus, despite the new deputy’s substantial contributions to 
improved management, he left JPL and accepted a position outside NASA 
before the seven Surveyor flights were completed. 
In  several instances, difficulties within the Surveyor and Centaur 
project organizations became so serious that representatives of general 
management were designated to assume direct day-to-day responsibility 
for management. A representative of JPL’s senior management served 
as Surveyor project manager for a critical period: the Deputy Associate 
Administrator in Headquarters Office of Space Science and Applications 
acted in the capacity of Surveyor program manager; and, for several 
months, the Director of the Lewis Research Center was project manager 
of Centaur. Ideally, a project, once assigned to a responsible field center, 
would not require such penetrating intervention by Headquarters. Only 
a monitoring function was needed on Lunar Orbiter. 
In  view of the eventual success of Surveyor and more than a dozen 
other projects that were simultaneously sponsored in the area of space 
science and applications, the overall record is impressive. Cost escalations, 
however, were not uncommon and many projects slipped behind schedules. 
By intervening in Surveyor, Headquarters helped reduce constraints 
for which it shared a considerable degree of responsibility. The original 
underestimation of the complexity of the Surveyor program, the imposition 
of manpower and financial ceilings, prolonged insistence on an unreason- 
ably open-ended combination of scientific experiments for the payload, 
the many changes in scope and objectives of the program, and the tying 
of Surveyor to an unproven launch vehicle were all problem-causing fac- 
tors that were attributable to decisions made by Headquarters. Only 
Headquarters could effectively ameliorate them. 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, as the responsible management 
34 UNMANNED SPACE PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
center, was slow to accord the Surveyor project the priority that Head- 
quarters wanted it to receive. The deep concern of top JPL management 
caused by the series of troubles encountered in the Ranger project and 
the requirements for other in-house projects limited JPL’s efforts on 
Surveyor. I t  took a major Headquarters review and persistent Head- 
quarters directives, both orally and in writing, to bring JPL management 
to improve the Surveyor project organization. 
The Headquarters review in the spring of 1964 also pinpointed a 
number of deficiencies in the Hughes Aircraft Co. organization. Head- 
quarters instituted a direct watch over Hughes operations to assure that 
more support was being given to the project and that more attention 
was being given from senior levels of Hughes management. Headquarters 
continued to be dissatisfied with aspects of Hughes management and 
technical performance well into the operational phase of the project. 
When all the demanding tasks involved in the Surveyor lunar 
landing missions were complete, the aftermath was characterized by 
institutional friction. In  each of the three principal organizations involved 
in the project-NASA Headquarters, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and 
Hughes-the Surveyor personnel tended to view their own organization’s 
contribution as the critical key to success. For the record, each organiza- 
tion has formally acknowledged that team effort was essential to ultimate 
success. But among Surveyor personnel in the three participating organiza- 
tions there is far less willingness to acknowledge the contribution of other 
groups and individuals than there is among the participants in the Lunar 
Oribiter project. 
INCENTIVE CONTRACTING 
The Surveyor spacecraft systems contract was awarded on the basis 
of a source evaluation by JPL, and JPL negotiated the contract with 
Hughes. The contract was written as the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) type, 
and was converted to an incentive basis quite late in the program-n 
the day before the launch of the first Surveyor spacecraft. JPL’s admin- 
istration of the CPFF contract failed to keep pace with the many change 
orders and modifications, and fell far behind in its accounting of the 
financial status of the project. About a year of intensive work in the 
Surveyor contract office was needed to upgrade contract records. At about 
the same time, JPL, in response to Headquarters direction, began efforts 
to persuade Hughes to convert to an incentive contract. Although Hughes 
at first resisted, strong Headquarters insistence induced Hughes manage- 
ment to accept the new contract. When the project was completed, the 
company earned fees totaling several million dollars more than their 
minimal expectations under the CPFF contract. 
Both customer and contractor management then regarded conver- 
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sion of the contract as a highly beneficial administrative measure well 
worth the massive effort entailed. The entire work breakdown structure 
and financial reporting system had to be revised as part of the total 
conversion process. After the conversion, however, it was possible for 
the first time in several years for customer and contractor to operate on 
the basis of mutual agreement on the status of the contract. 
More important, the incentives had a highly beneficial impact on 
Hughes’ performance. The prospect of earning fees tied to specified and 
realistic cost and schedule targets motivated all levels of personnel. 
General management at Hughes had played an active role in negotiating 
the contract conversion and took steps to assure that the entire project 
received full support. An award fee in the new contract provided addi- 
tional incentives for high standards of performance in the management 
and operation of the project. This fee stimulated maximum effort in all 
areas of project management over and above those that had a direct 
relationship to costs and schedules. 
The original negotiated cost of the Hughes contract for seven space- 
craft was $67 million. Final Hughes contract costs came to $365 million, 
over a fivefold increase. For Lunar Orbiter, the original negotiated cost 
of the spacecraft contract was $84 million and the estimated final contract 
costs at $144 million represented less than a twofold increase. There is 
no incontrovertible method of correlating the cost performance on Lunar 
Orbiter with the fact that it was the first major NASA flight program 
to be undertaken on the basis of an incentive contract. Although the 
incentive fees were generally regarded as a positive feature in the con- 
tractual relationship between customer and contractor, the Boeing Go. 
representatives attribute less significance to incentives than to the strong 
corporate determination to achieve success in their first spaceflight project. 
The Boeing contract for Lunar Orbiter was cost plus incentive fee, 
whereas the two major subcontracts with Eastman Kodak and RCA were 
CPFF. Boeing’s management had anticipated that, once having negotiated 
the prime contract, they would be able to persuade the two subcontractor 
firms of the advantages of an incentive form of contract. Both Eastman 
and RCA held out firmly against what they considered an untested and 
risky method of contracting. The absence of incentives in the two major 
subcontracts tended to undercut the impact of the incentives in the overall 
spacecraft system development. 
As the first major NASA project to be awarded on an incentive basis, 
Lunar Orbiter broke important new ground in the development of stand- 
ards for determining and administering fee awards. Both Lunar Orbiter 
and Surveyor experiences attest to the positive value of incentives. NASA’s 
early favorable experience with incentive contracting on such projects as 
Lunar Orbiter led the agency to increase the use of this type of contract 
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to the point where it represented 68 percent of total award obligations 
for external research and development in 1968. 
More recent years have brought a shift away from incentives, down 
to a level of 46 percent in 1970. This shift reflects growing awareness 
that dollar profits may be less of a motivating force in a private organiza- 
tion's performance than the impetus to hold a place in a growth market 
or the need to assure corporate survival. Despite this decline in the rcla- 
tive importance of incentives, Lunar Orbiter contracting experience was 
worth while because it helpcd to inform NASA about effective approaches 
to research and development procurement. 
COST PERFORMANCE 
Analysis and interpretation of cost data relating to space projects 
is a complex task involving many variables. Assuring complete objectivity 
is difficult. From the viewpoint of achieving the goals of the national 
space program, what matters is essentially the ratio of costs to the amount 
of scientific and space engineering information produced in each project. 
Did the spacecraft send back the kind of data that it had been designed 
to retrieve? Were the data useful to the scientific community and to 
engineers and technicians engaged in other ongoing space activities? 
Measuring by thme criteria almost inevitably involves subjective judg- 
ments concerning the utility of the data returned. 
NASA's original estimated total cost of the Surveyor project was 
$125 million whereas the final costs came to $469 million, somewhat less 
than a fourfold increase. Lunar Orbiter costs were first estimated at $77 
million and wound up at  $163 million, or slightly more than a twofold 
increase. To gage these two records of cost performance, it is useful to 
compare them with other NASA projects in unmanned space exploration. 
An analysis of 16 research and development projects being conducted by 
OSSA during the sixties indicates that the average final costs were some- 
what less than three and a half times the initial estimate." Extended 
delays in several of the early OSSA projects as well as increases in the 
number of spacecraft flown contributed to substantial cost escalations in 
several of the earlier projects . 
Costs, of course, are in considerable part a function of time. The 
nearly fourfold increase in the total cost of Surveyor over the original 
estimate reflects the fact that the project took more than two years longer 
than originally estimated. Previous discussion has brought out many 
factors contributing to delays in Surveyor. The early planning for Surveyor 
" Final cost estimates for 16 OSSA projects totaled approximately $2.5 billion in 
comparison with original estimates of about $784 million. (From Memorandum 
from Assistant Administrator for Program Plans and Analysis to the Administrator, 
subject: NASA Project Cost Projections (Apr. 10, 1969) .) 
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was highly unrealistic and vastly underestimated the complexity of the 
task. 
Lunar Orbiter final costs, in contrast, were only slightly more than 
double the original schedule, the first launch being made within two 
months of the initial target date. The preceding analysis discloses how 
Lunar Orbiter managers took advantage of the three years of learning 
experience that elapsed between the start of the Surveyor program and 
the initiation of their project. The Lunar Orbiter record compares favor- 
ably with the overall OSSA performance. 
Both Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter were highly successful from the 
viewpoint of gathering scientific and engineering data essential to the 
Apollo program and future lunar exploration. The data on the chemical 
composition, density, and bearing strength of the lunar surface acquired 
by means of Surveyor’s instruments were essential to the planning of 
Apollo landings. The photographic data acquired from both Surveyor 
and Lunar Orbiter formed the essential basis for selection of initial 
Apollo landing sites. The acquisition of these data and their systematic 
exploitation called for an effective relationship between the hundreds of 
consulting scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged in the projects. 
The manner in which this relationship evolved is discussed in the following 
section. 
SCIENCE/ENGINEERING RELATIONS 
Meshing the interests of scientists and engineers in the Surveyor 
program was a real challenge and the source of much management 
difficulty. 
Communications barriers between scientists and engineers reflect the 
differing motivations and orientations of the two disciplines. The scientist 
tends by and large to be interested in acquiring knowledge about his 
special field. For him, the mechanical means for attaining that knowledge 
may be of only incidental interest. The engineer or technician, on the 
other hand, is likely to be primarily interested in the mechanics of an 
instrument problem. In a gross sense, he focuses his interests on the “how 
to do” rather than the “what to do.” Though he wants and needs to know 
enough about the scientific objectives of an experiment to do his engi- 
neering work satisfactorily, he is essentially concerned with the very prac- 
tical issues of what will work. 
There are also likely to be wide divergences among scientists seeking 
data from a spacecraft. One scientist does not necessarily have much 
interest in the work of other scientists whose experiments may be riding 
on the same space “bus” as his. Only in the later phases of the Surveyor 
program were the principal investigators and other science advisors for 
Surveyor brought into full realization of the interdependence of the 
various experiments. 
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NASA Headquarters, where the selections of scientific experiments 
for Surveyor were made, was pressed by the scientific community to pursue 
many different lines of investigation via Surveyor. These pressures made 
Headquarters reluctant to narrow the options for change. Indeed, in the 
early years when Surveyor was conceived as a three-block program, there 
was good reason to plan for a broad and diverse science program. But it 
now appears to have been quite unreasonable for Headquarters to have 
insisted that the design of the spacecraft be such as to accommodate any 
combination of some 30 science experiments, particularly when most of 
the experiments were also continually being changed. 
T o  avoid some science/engineering problems, the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory kept the Surveyor science investigator teams somewhat 
removed from the technicians and engineers responsible for instrument 
design. JPL was concerned that scientists might disrupt the work of the 
engineers and that some engineers might become overly committed to 
perfecting a scientist’s pet experiment. In  time, the need for such concern 
diminished. But in the early years of Surveyor, the slight concern of the 
scientific investigators for the impact of their experiments on spacecraft 
performance caused trouble for project managers. 
Whenever science is an important aspect of an engineering task, 
the scientific objectives must be clearly recognized at the outset. Special 
management attention should be given to those levels of the engineering 
organization at which the science inputs are made to be sure that they 
are properly incorporated in the payload. The scientists responsible for the 
experiments must work closely with the engineers responsible for the 
basic assembly on which the experiments will ride. 
The photographs and other data on the lunar surface returned 
by Surveyor aroused great interest in the scientific community. NASA 
Headquarters and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory developed highly eff ec- 
tive machinery for collecting, analyzing, and widely disseminating scientific 
data. Thus the Surveyor data served the interests of both those responsible 
for planning the Apollo landings and the growing ranks of scientists 
interested in information on the Moon. 
Lunar Orbiter had no major science objectives until they were added 
for the last two flights. The U.S. Geological Survey was the only outside 
group involved, and Langley Research Center needed only a small science 
complement. The Lunar Orbiter consequently had fewer problems than 
Surveyor and less need for the elaborate organizational structure that 
was established for Surveyor, a project in which more than 100 outside 
scientists and a highly sophisticated science division at the responsible 
field center were involved. Nevertheless, the photographs returned from 
Lunar Orbiter and the data collected on the last two flights provided a 
rich store of information that is still being widely studied and analyzed 
by lunar and other scientists. 
Y sis 
HAT is the essence of the management learning experience gained 
in the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter undertakings? Can this 
experience be synthesized into meaningful and significant concepts rele- 
vant to the management of future undertakings? How important is the 
management” of the project relative to other factors such as environ- 
ment and the state of the technology? Are there apparent means sug- 
gested by Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter for transfer of learning experience? 
Is the experience applicable exclusively to similar advanced-technology 
research and development projects, or can there be lateral transference 
to the broader field of management in general? 
What emerges perhaps most forcefully from a broad retrospective 
view is the importance of the human aspects of organization and manage- 
ment. Both projects demonstrated the critical nature of human skills, 
interpersonal relations, compatibility between individual managers, and 
teamwork. The Surveyor experience brought out these lessons, for the 
most part, by demonstrating the effects of gaps or barriers in the total 
web of managerial relationships. Many of the difficulties of the Surveyor 
project can be traced to individual and institutional discords that stood in 
the way of communication and agreement based on mutual interest in 
resolving project problems. Despite all the formal reporting systems, 
communications in the early stages of Surveyor were generally inadequate, 
both within and between the participating organizations. Individual 
managers in the various customer and contractor organizations were often 
surprised by a failure of their counterparts to follow what seemed to be 
the obvious course to get the job done. 
Lunar Orbiter demonstrated the importance of leadership commit- 
ment to a project. When all levels of management fully support an 
endeavor, the odds for its successful completion obviously improve. In  an 
environment marked by mutual respect and confidence of all participating 
organizations, Lunar Orbiter maintained its schedules and avoided many 
c c  
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of the kinds of trouble that beset advanced research and development 
projects. 
Surveyor demonstrated the depth of trouble a project can encounter 
when the full column of management support is incomplete. The general 
management structure of the Surveyor project at both the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory and Hughes Aircraft Co. tended to be too removed from the 
project and too little committed to its necessary priorities. As one of the 
consequences, a multiple tier of suspicion and mistrust developed among 
the participants. Midway in the project, massive corrective measures, 
sometimes to the point of overcompensation, had to be instituted to assure 
the success of the Surveyor missions. Surveyor managers applied elaborate, 
detailed, and costly formal reporting systems in their attempts to keep 
the project on track. Lunar Orbiter managers, by contrast, had learned to 
reduce the amount of formal reporting and maximize the value of the 
informal links between project counterparts. 
People make organizations; different kinds of people make different 
kinds of organizations. The field center personnel assigned to Surveyor 
were, by dint of circumstances of the time, very different from the kinds 
assigned to Lunar Orbiter. There was considerable reluctance at JPL to 
jeopardize professional careers in a project assignment. The professional 
staff charged with responsibility for Surveyor tended to be highly special- 
ized in various research fields of science or engineering. The professional 
staff from which the Lunar Orbiter team was selected was eager to accept 
the challenge of the first spaceflight project assigned to them. Whereas the 
best talents were not applied to Surveyor until relatively late in the project’s 
development, some of the best talents were assigned to Lunar Orbiter 
at the outset. 
As between the prime contractors, the differences in makeup of 
Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter personnel were mainly in the degree of prior 
project experience. Personnel assigned to Surveyor were, for the most 
part, not trained in that type of project activity and few had the systems 
management capability needed. For Lunar Orbiter, large numbers of 
qualified technicians and managerial personnel who had worked with 
each other on prior projects were available. They began, moreover, with 
three years’ more learning experience. 
The  different attitudes of Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter personnel 
upon the completion of their respective projects is significant. Some per- 
sonnel at JPL still tended to regard their Surveyor experience as a side- 
track in their career advancement. Some felt that not enough effort had 
been made to apply their experience effectively in new assignments. 
Among Lunar Orbiter personnel, on the contrary, there was almost uni- 
versal feeling that this project involvement had been a net plus in their 
careers. 
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Association with a successful undertaking breeds pride and confid- 
ence. Lunar Orbiter teams acquired a positive outlook almost from the 
beginning. For years Surveyor teams were harassed by serious technical 
problems, doubts about the technical feasibility of the entire undertaking, 
and second-class citizenship within their immediate environment. 
The lesson here is obviously not that technical organizations should 
limit new undertakings to the least risky or demanding enterprises. Tough 
technical challenges must continue to be accepted by organizations aspir- 
ing to lead in technical endeavor. Perhaps the lesson centers on how the 
requirer and the producer reach agreement on their contract. General 
management of customer and contractor organizations must agree before- 
hand on the method of dealing with questions posed by sometimes con- 
flicting priorities in allocating manpower and resources. Although it is 
far easier to make such a general observation in hindsight than to deal 
with such issues in practice, the assignment of priorities and allocation of 
resources by general management undoubtedly may be a determining factor 
in a project’s outcome. 
Many of the organizations and individuals engaged in spaceflight 
projects such as Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter have now moved on to 
work in non-space-related fields. Despite the differences in technologies 
or differing environments surrounding their new enterprises, what they 
have learned about managing projects is still broadly applicable to their 
new ventures. The management skills represented in organizing and 
directing a space exploration project are not sui generis. Rather, they are 
a combination of common sense, managerial sensitivity, and technical 
competence adaptable to rapidly changing situations. 
Although each manager setting out on a new task may view his 
assignment as a completely new departure, he is actually part of a 
continuum. Just as he brings to his task his own past knowledge and 
experience, so his colleagues bring theirs. The successful project manager 
is one who is able to provide the kind of leadership that effectively taps 
this experience, focusing a common effort upon common gods through 
a progression of commonly accepted intermediary steps. 
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